view: "In spite of . . . the abundance that reigns, there are few countries that have so much poverty among the humbler classes. However great the empire may be, it is too crowded for the multitude that inhabit it." 3 Malthus therefore viewed China as the third point of a theoretical triangle, belonging to a class of countries with periods "when population increased permanently, without an increase in the means of subsistence." In such countries, "population appears to have been forced, that is, the people have been habituated by degrees to live almost upon the smallest possible quantity of food." China answered this description because "if the accounts we have of it are to be trusted, the lower class of people are in the habit of living almost upon the smallest quantity of food and are glad to get any putrid offals that European laborers would rather starve than eat." A country in this condition "must necessarily be subject to famines."
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Although Malthus never doubted his views of Britain and the United States, he was never entirely happy with his conclusions regarding China. What worried him most was the report that despite every acre of tillable land having long been under cultivation, marriage was early and nearly universal. In his ªrst mention of China, he called for "inqueries [sic] into the manner and habits of the lower classes and the encouragements of early marriage." "Perhaps," he wondered, "the fact of the universality of early marriage may not be sufªciently ascertained." He assumed that if marriage was in fact early and universal, fertility must have been high. He therefore thought it was of "the utmost importance" to ascertain "in what manner the checks to a further population operate; what are the vices, and what are the distresses that prevent an increase of numbers beyond the ability of the country to support." women, he could only conclude that their fertility was proportionally higher, guaranteed by "the passion between the sexes." But why, then, did the Chinese marry in such great proportions and at the earliest possible age? Many people were already living on "the smallest possible quantity of food." Why, despite the misery that this must inevitably have entailed, did even the poorest among them marry at the ªrst opportunity?
Until recently, most scholars agreed that developments since Malthus' time had largely resolved his doubts while conªrming his general view of China. Surveys conducted in the 1930s and archival studies of genealogies indicated that despite early and universal marriage, Chinese fertility was not as high as Malthus appears to have imagined, largely because of late weaning, poor nutrition, and female infanticide. It was, however, high enough to produce a population that could appropriately be described as "forced." All of the evidence pointed to high infant and childhood mortality, low adult life expectancy, widespread poverty, and frequent famines-what we call "the received wisdom." It is represented most effectively in Ping-ti Ho's Studies on the Population of China, 1368 China, -1953 Lee and Wang challenge this view in their inºuential book, One Quarter of Humanity: Malthusian Mythology and Chinese Realities, 1700-2000 . They agree that marriage was early and universal in China but otherwise reject all of the Malthusian view of China. They argue that China should not be conceived of as a third type of society distinct from both Britain and the United States. In their view, Britain and China were both old states in which population was constrained by preventive rather than positive checks. They differed only in how they managed fertility-the British by controlling marriage and the Chinese by controlling marital fertility. Lee and Wang sum up their argument in Malthus' own language: "Whereas European couples practiced moral restraint [that is, they did not marry if they did not have the means to support a family] but little marital restraint, Chinese couples practiced no moral restraint but considerable marital restraint."
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A large proportion of Lee and Wang's text is devoted to demonstrating that marital fertility was lower in China than it was in FERTILITY IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY CHINA | 347
Britain and other European states. Although their observation that Chinese women bore fewer children per year of marriage than European women is not controversial, they exaggerate the magnitude of the difference. Their further contention that Chinese fertility was generally lower than Europe's because Chinese couples deliberately limited the size of their families cannot withstand scrutiny. The Chinese practiced little, if any, effective birth control. China's marital fertility may well have been lower than Europe's, but its total fertility was far higher.
Lee and Wang's primary thesis concerning the relative importance of positive and preventive checks rests on the claim that marital fertility control in China was the equivalent of marriage control in Britain. To prove it, they must demonstrate that Chinese fertility was no higher than British fertility, but they fail to do so; they do not even try. They report total fertility rates for China, but they never compare them with British or European total fertility rates. Although they repeatedly contrast Chinese and European marital rates, they never risk comparing their total rates. They claim that "Chinese fertility overall was not much higher than European fertility, while marital fertility was signiªcantly lower," but offer no data to support the ªrst half of their claim.
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What was the average total fertility rate in China prior to the 1949 revolution, and how does it compare with the average British rate? The one pre-1949 rate that Lee and Wang report is the ªgure calculated by Barclay et al. on the basis of John Lossing Buck's famous farm surveys-5.5. It is an estimate based on data collected by male students who, as males, were unable to interview their female subjects and had to depend on information provided by husbands or other male relatives. When Wolf revisited seven of the communities included in the study and interviewed women old enough to have been included in the Buck study, he obtained a rate of 5.78. The fact that older women had trouble remembering children who died as infants suggests that the true rate could be close to 6.0.
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The best reason for suspecting that the ªgure from the Buck survey underestimates Chinese fertility is another survey con-348 | ARTHUR P. WOLF AND THEO ENGELEN ducted from 1930 to 1934 by Chiao, Thompson, and Chen. Whereas the Buck survey was a student effort directed by an agricultural economist, the Chiao, Thompson, and Chen study was a professional effort directed by one of the leading demographers of the time. Unlike Buck and his student collaborators, the researchers did not rely on interviews. They set up their own registration system in rural Kiangsu, and recorded births and deaths as they occurred for four years. The result is the most authoritative demographic data collected on the Chinese mainlaind prior to the fertility survey conducted by the State Family Planning Commission in 1982. The fertility data from this study are reproduced in original form in Table 1 . The age-speciªc rates for the four years yield total fertility rates of 6. 86, 6.24, 5.58, and 6.85 . The decline in the second and third years of the study is interesting as evidence of the factors effecting Chinese fertility. Chiao, Thompson, and Chen attribute it to a depression that lowered the marriage rate and a malaria epidemic that raised the miscarriage rate.
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One of the numerous scholarly failings of Lee and Wang's effort is the failure to discuss the Chiao, Thompson, and Chen study. The work is not even listed as a reference. Equally egregious is their failure to refer to Tuan's 1958 study of fertility in rural Taiwan during the Japanese occupation-one of the seven studies that form the basis of Henry's deªnition of natural fertility and a seemingly indispensable primary source for any book devoted to Chinese demography. Tuan's data are reproduced in Table 2 in the form of period rates for the years 1903 to 1953. Only the rate for the years 1903 to 1907 falls below 6.0, and there is reason to believe that this ªgure underestimates the true rate. Concerned that some children who died as infants may not have been registered, Tuan interviewed 463 of the women included in the study. He found that 9.5 percent of births by women aged sixty or older at the time of the study did not appear in the registers. Among women aged forty-ªve to sixty the ªgure was only 1.5 percent.
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Although Tuan's work suggests that under-registration oc- curred before 1915, the household registers compiled by the Japanese colonial government are the best basis for estimating the fertility of any large Chinese population. Household heads were required to report all births and deaths to the police within ten days, and the police visited every household at least once a year to make sure that these reports were accurate. The records from twenty-two of the Taiwanese communities subjected to this regime are represented in the fertility rates reported in Table 3 . The residents of the localities included in the table were all Hokkienor Hakka-speaking Han Chinese. Localities with a substantial non-Han population were excluded.
12
The ªrst point to note about Table 3 is that, with one slight exception, the rates for 1906 to 1915 are lower than the rates for the later periods, undoubtedly because of the under-registration documented by Tuan. All of these rates should be 5 to 10 percent higher than shown. The second point to note is that the rates for 1936 to 1945 are all lower than the rates for 1926 to 1935-almost certainly a result of the many kinds of disruption occasioned by World War II. The third point is that the rates for urban Taiwan are substantially lower than those for peri-urban and rural Taiwan, and the rates for peri-urban Taiwan somewhat lower than those for rural Taiwan. Wolf and Gates reason that urban and peri-urban women were less likely to marry than rural women. During the Japanese occupation, nearly one-fourth of the women raised in Taipei City failed to marry by age ªfty. Table 3 is a set of ªgures that makes two points: (1) that in rural Taiwan, total fertility averaged approximately 6.0-a little higher than the rates calculated on the basis of the Buck survey but not as high as those documented by Chiao, Thompson, and Chen in Kiangsu; (2) that contrary to Lee and Wang's primary thesis, fertility in Taiwan was conditioned by entry into marriage, not by deliberate control within marriage. Only in Taipei City, where a large proportion of women failed to marry, did rates fall below 5.0. It took a European-like marriage pattern to produce European-like fertility rates.
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Although the evidence from Taiwan is the most reliable evidence available, should it be asked to give testimony in a case trying claims about China as a whole? Taiwan was under Japanese occupation when the evidence was recorded, and it was a lawless frontier not long before the Japanese arrived. Yet, in its favor, Taiwan was settled by farmers from southern Fukien and northern Kwangtung who transplanted all of the institutions of their native places. The manner in which these institutions differed from those typical of other provinces does not appear to have resulted in distinctive demographic characteristics. The fertility rates reported in Table 3 are not exceptional. They fall approximately half way between the rates estimated on the basis of Buck's nation-wide survey and the rates reported by Chiao, Thompson, and Chen for a locality close to the center of the most populated region of the country.
The evidence cited to this point all refers to the years 1900 to 1949. With the exception of the genealogy of the Ch'ing imperial family and the household registers of Han bannermen in Manchuria, the only evidence available for earlier years comes from genealogies compiled by the corporate kinship groups that anthropologists call "lineages." This evidence is invaluable because it is the only evidence, but it has serious limitations. Its ºaws can be overcome sufªciently to extract fertility rates but only with the help of assumptions about the nature of vital events in the distant past, the most important of which concern the sex ratio at birth and infant and childhood mortality. Lineage genealogists did not record female births and recorded male births only if the boy survived to an age speciªed by lineage rules, usually between ªfteen and twenty years. Table A1 shows woman-years for fertility rates.
lished by Liu range from 4.47 to 6.27, averaging 5.71. Those published by Telford range from 6.78 to 9.56, averaging 8.21. The large difference between the two authors' ªgures is almost entirely a result of their treatment of the way lineage genealogists recorded births. Liu based her rates on a simple count of the births recorded, whereas Telford adjusted his rates to take account of infant and childhood mortality. He assumes an infant morality rate of 250 and a childhood and adolescent rate of 100. When Liu's rates are adjusted in the same way, they suggest a fertility rate of approximately 7.9 for the years 1450 to 1900. This rate would be substantially higher given the assumption that infant mortality was as high in these years as it was among the children of the women included in Buck's farm surveys. Barclay et al. estimated their infant mortality rate as 300 and their childhood/adolescent age rate at more than 200.
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The rates that Liu and Telford estimate on the basis of the lineage genealogies are all marital fertility rates. To obtain total fertility rates requires the assumption that Chinese marriage rates were as high in the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties as they were in the Republican period. The differences between the total and marital rates reported by the studies cited above can then be used to estimate total fertility in the years covered by the genealogies. These differences are 0.68 births in the case of the rates estimated from the Buck surveys; 1.03 births in the case of the rates reported by Chiao, Thompson, and Chen; and an average of 1.43 births in the case of the rates calculated on the basis of the Taiwan household registers. Hence, the total fertility rate in the three centuries covered by the genealogies must have been at least as high as it was in the early decades of the twentieth century.
Late Imperial China was about 6.0-a ªgure that makes obvious Liu and Wang's reasons for avoiding direct comparisons of Chinese and European total fertility rates. 
17
The fact that China's total fertility was high by European standards does not necessarily mean that Chinese couples did not take steps to limit their number of children. Conceivably, were it not for deliberate fertility control, Chinese fertility would have been as high as Malthus feared. Lee and and Wang's claim that "Chinese couples practiced no moral restraint but considerable marital restraint" needs to be addressed fully.
Lee and Wang introduce their book with the statement, "Chinese married women had a TMFR [total marital fertility rate] of 6 or less." "This low marital fertility was," in their view, "one of the most distinctive features of the Chinese demographic system." Their evidence is gathered in a table reproduced herein as Table 4 . The ªrst three ªgures, which are from Liu's analyses of lineage genealogies, are gross underestimates that take no account of infant and childhood mortality. The ªgures in the fourth line of the table refer to Telford's study but misrepresent his results. The range for the rates from the genealogies that he analyzed was from 7.24 to 9.19-not 5.4 to 8.2; the average ªgure was 8.2!
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The ªfth ªgure-the ªgure that pulls the average down to "less than 6"-should not be included in the the Ch'ing imperial genealogy, is not relevant to the argument. Lee and Wang admit that these people are "atypical, since the Qing imperial lineage was an elite population that depended solely on the state for ªnancial support, was highly regulated, and was required to live in either Beijing or Shenyang." They should have added that, in addition to being a welfare elite, these people were not Han Chinese.
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The sixth ªgure in the list raises again Malthus' view of the population in the United States as growing "with astonishing rapidity" because it had "plenty of food and room." Most scholars now agree that this characteristic was typical of colonies. In the years covered by Lee and Wang's data, Liaoning was also a colony with plentiful resources. Why do they ªnd that fertility there was no higher than in China proper where resources were scarce? The likely answer is that their data derive from records maintained by the corrupt administration of a military colony. The colonists had good reason not to register their sons and ample opportunity to avoid doing so. As Isett wrote with respect to Lee and Wang's data from Daoyi, Lee and Campbell' Campbell believe fully one-half of all persons (one-third of males and two-thirds of females) were never registered on the banner rolls, a proportion that is in turn predicated on their belief that all of those who survived to age sixteen sui (age ªfteen) were registered. There were good reasons to keep children, especially males, off the banner roll after they reached sixteen sui, however. As Lee and Campbell note males in the banner system were liable for uncompensated service to the state, including military service, which heads of household would certainly wish to avoid.
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The source of the ªnal ªgure in the list is Barclay et al.'s reanalysis of Buck's 1930 to 1934 farm surveys. The ªgure obtained herein from the table that Lee and Wang cite as their source is 6.3, rather than 6.2, which does not matter much. What does matter is that Lee and Wang fail to note that when Wolf revisited a number of Buck's ªeld sites, he obtained a rate of 7.03. What matters even more is that the table does not include the evidence provided by Chiao, Thompson, and Chen. The total marital fertility rates for the four years of their study were 8.00, 7.23, 6.64, and 7.80. The average was 7.41.
21
Many families in northern Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands gave away their daughters as infants or small children, raising in their stead wives for their sons. Wolf showed that because of early association, couples married in this fashion had markedly lower fertility than couples joined as young adults. When the effect of these "minor marriages" is discounted, the data drawn from the Taiwan household registers agrees with that reported by Chiao, Thompson, and Chen. Allowing for 5 to 10 percent under-registration before 1915, the ªgures for the rural areas in Table 5 average close to 7.50 before 1925 and rise to well over 8.5 after 1925. The ªgures for the urban and peri-urban areas are lower but still average well above 6.0 in most years. Only in Taipei city before 1925 can the level of marital fertility that Lee and Wang take to be normal for all of China be found.
22
Lee and Wang's representation of marital fertility in late traditional China is mistaken. The average rate was approximately 7.5 Table 5 Table A2 shows woman-years for fertility rates.
rather than 6.0-still well below the typical European rate and far below the rate reported for such exemplary populations as the Hutterites. Thus, the numbers leave room for Lee and Wang's contention that Chinese couples practiced some form of deliberate birth control. The question is whether the difference between Chinese and the European levels was due to deliberate control or to an involuntary condition. Lee and Wang admit that Chinese mothers "practiced extended breastfeeding" and that this process "contributed to long birth intervals and low fertility," but they nonetheless insist that their "low fertility" was the result of "their ability and even willingness to regulate coital frequency" and their use of "a wide variety of abortive techniques."
23
This claim is all the more surprising because Lee and Wang recognize that Chinese fertility does not exhibit the characteristics that most demographers, following Henry, take to be diagnostic of deliberate fertility control. "Control," according to Henry, "may be said to exist when the behavior of the couple is bound to the number of children already born and is modiªed when this number reaches the maximum which the couple does not wish to exceed." Fertility that is not bound in this way Henry terms "natural fertility." It is high when people are young and declines slowly as they age, producing a convex curve when fertility is plotted against age. Deliberate fertility control is suspected only when when fertility begins high and declines abruptly, producing a concave age/fertility proªle.
24
Although the fertility of natural-fertility populations is generally high, there is considerable variation. Consequently, fertility that falls short of the highest rates recorded is not necessarily evidence of control. The age/fertility relationship is crucial. In the view of most demographers, deliberate fertility control always produces a concave age/fertility proªle; a convex proªle is evidence of lack of control. A relevant example is Barclay et al.'s interpretation of the rates estimated on the basis of Buck's Farm Survey. It characterizes Chinese marital fertility as "very low" but rules out deliberate fertility control as an explanation because "when control of fertility is common, the fertility of older married women is especially low relative to the fertility of young women.
Yet the age-speciªc marital fertility of older Chinese women is as high, relative to that of the younger women, as in many populations judged by Henry to have uncontrolled or natural fertility."
25
Lee and Wang agree that Chinese fertility was "natural" in Henry's sense of the term, but they reject Barclay et al.'s conclusion regarding birth control. They insist that despite presenting a convex age/fertility proªle, Chinese fertility was a product of deliberate control achieved by means of "late starting, wide spacing, and early stopping." Chinese couples married young but deliberately delayed their ªrst birth, deliberately avoided producing a child in their later years, and deliberately spaced all of their births as widely as possible. The result was a fertility proªle that looked like natural fertility but was in fact the product of a life of deliberate control.
26
The reason why Henry's distinction has served demographers well is that control of the kind hypothesized by Liu and Wang is both difªcult and risky-difªcult because of the extraordinary restraint required during youth and risky because of a couple's inability to count on their reproductive capacity surviving the many hazards of aging, particularly in historical societies such as China where famine was frequent, epidemics common, and social stability uncertain. Given that Chinese couples all wanted at least two sons, why would they adopt such a difªcult and risky strategy? If they were as adept at birth control as Lee and Wang argue, why not wait until they had the children that they wanted and then initiate a control program, as Taiwanese couples did during the fertility transition.
There is some evidence that Chinese women did not want as many children as their husbands and may have made an effort in their later years to avoid additional pregnancies. Otherwise, Chinese couples bore as many children as possible given their circumstances. What Lee and Wang characterize as abortifacients were, in most cases, emmenogogues, employed to enhance, rather than to reduce, fertility. The fertility rates that they cite as evidence of deliberate control were, with the partial expectation of early stopping, the result of involuntary conditions producing unintended and largely unwanted consequences.
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Although the interval between marriage and ªrst birth was considerably longer in China than in Europe, and Chinese women were younger at the birth of their last child than European women were, the evidence does not support deliberate birth control. The great majority of Chinese women married at, or shortly after, menarche if not before. A long ªrst interval was therefore inevitable because "the ªrst several years following menarche are characterized by a high fraction of anovulatory cycles" and "an elevated risk of fetal loss should conception occur." Because child bearing was onerous, some Chinese women may have taken steps to avoid bearing yet another child late in life, but this is only one of many possible explanations of what Lee and Wang call "early stopping." Another is the possibility that because of poverty and a high incidence of debilitating diseases, Chinese women aged faster than European women. Yet another is suggested by James' discovery that "coital rates are much more closely related to duration of marriage than to age." By the time they were in their mid-thirties, most Chinese women had been married twice as long as their European counterparts.
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The critical claim in Lee and Wang's argument-the plank on which their whole argument rests-is that Chinese couples limited their number of children by deliberately prolonging the intervals between their births. The fact that birth intervals were as long in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh as in China militates against the argument. But the Taiwan household registers provide more direct, and thus more conclusive, evidence. They reveal how many children a woman had borne by any age and how many she bore after that age This information makes it possible to evaluate Lee and Wang's thesis by examining how a couple's past reproductive performance affected their future performance.
The received view of Chinese fertility is that most couples made no effort to control their fertility because they wanted as many sons as possible. It predicts that the more children a woman has borne in the past, the more she will bear in the future because her fertility history indexes her fecundity. Lee and Wang's view is that since most couples wanted only a limited number of sons, they spaced their births to achieve but not overshoot this mark.
Their position predicts that any relationship between past and future performance is bound to be negative. Couples who reproduced too rapidly when young would have made an effort to slow down later, whereas those who reproduced too slowly when young would have made an effort to speed up later.
To test these views, this study calculates fertility rates that take account of how many children a woman has borne, her age at the birth of her last child, and the number of years since the birth of that child. These are duration-speciªc rates in which the duration is the years elapsed since the birth of a given child (the index child in Figure 1 ). These rates indicate whether past fertility inºuences the future fertility of women who bear children at a designated age. Figure 1 says that it does-but in the opposite direction of what Lee and Wang predict. The columns in each of the ªve age classes all point to the same conclusion: The more children women have borne, the more they will bear in the future. With the partial exception of women nearing the end of their reproductive lives, the columns in each cluster rise in step-like fashion from the lower parities to the higher parities, in exactly the way that the received view of Chinese fertility predicts. Because couples wanted as many sons as possible, they made no concerted effort to control their fertility. The result was a positive correlation between past and future performance because fertility was largely a function of fecundability. Couples who were fecund performed well at all ages; those who were not performed poorly at all ages.
Lee and Wang could reasonably argue that because of deliberate spacing, low fertility below a certain age predicts low fertility later. What their argument cannot accommodate is the evidence showing that high fertility below a certain age predicts high fertility later. To limit their fertility by means of deliberate spacing, a fecund couple had to begin spacing early in life. But if Chinese couples were adept in this regard, why did so many of them produce seven or eight children by the time the wife was thirty? And why, if Chinese couples wanted to limit their fertility, did these same couples bear more children later than their less fertile peers? Only toward the end of their reproductive lives did their fertility fall slightly below that of couples with fewer children. This decrease could be evidence of birth control, but far from necessarily. After having already borne eight or nine children, a wife might have been exhausted or suffering from wear and tear. Or, after Fig. 1 (continued) note The fertility rate shown herein is the average of the durations following the birth of the index child. The duration-speciªc rates are given in Table A3 . The woman-years for fertility rates are given in Table A4. quently, they never address the questions raised by placing China in a larger context. Was Chinese fertility low compared to the human average? Was it so low as to make deliberate birth control the only likely explanation? These demanding questions are answerable, thanks to Campbell and Wood, who, during the late 1980s, searched the literature for reliable data describing populations whose fertility qualiªed as "natural" by Henry's deªnition. They found such data for seventy societies and calculated a total fertility rate for each of them. Figure 2 presents their results, together with the total fertility rates of seventy societies showing "controlled" fertility by Henry's criterion. The mean total fertility rates are 6.1 for the natural-fertility populations and 2.6 for the controlledfertility populations.
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When placed in a global context, Chinese fertility was not low by human standards. In fact, at about 6.0, it was right on the mean for natural-fertility populations. This discovery does not prove that the Chinese refrained from deliberate birth control, but it adds greatly to the burden of proof that Lee and Wang must bear. They must either generalize their thesis to include most historical societies with early and nearly universal marriage, or they must give reasons why birth control in China was necessary to achieve a level of fertility produced by involuntary means in many other societies.
The other societies at or near the norm for natural-fertility populations include India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Was deliberate birth control common in these societies? If not, what kept fertility far below the recorded maximum? Bangladesh is particularly instructive because it has been the subject of intensive study, and its reproductive regime shares many of the same characteristics as China's. In both societies, marriage occurred at a young age (between sixteen and eighteen years for women); the median birth interval was long (thirty to thirty-four months); and the average age at last birth was young, compared to that in Europe (thirty-eight to thirty-nine years).
Some evidence suggests that older Bengali couples practiced coitus interruptus as a means of preventing or delaying additional births, though none of it indicates that this technique was a major determinant of Bengali fertility. The major determinant was a lengthy period of lactational amenorrhea-eighteen to twenty months-and consequently a long inter-birth interval-thirtythree to thirty-ªve months. Whether this interval was due primarily to Bengali nursing practices or to some combination of nursing practices and malnourishment is not clear. What is certain is that the subtraction of eighteen to twenty months of lactational amenorrhea and nine months of gestation from the average birth interval does not allow much time for birth control. An average of seven or eight months is common for women who do not practice birth control. Estimates of the length of lactational amenorrhea in Late Imperial China do not exist, but Chinese and Bengali women are known to have led similar lives. Like Bengali women, Chinese women were poor, and, like Bengali women, they nursed their children for two or more years. Hence, birth control is neither the only nor the most likely explanation of their low marital fertility. A more compelling explanation, given the known determinants of fertility in similar societies, is a long period of lactational amenorrhea due to some combination of malnourishment and prolonged breast feeding, as ªrst suggested by Barclay et al. to account for relatively low estimates of Chinese fertility. After ruling out deliberate birth control as a plausible explanation of the low maritalfertility rate estimated from the Farm Survey, they wrote:
Lacking further details . . . , we can conjecture its causes on the basis of interesting parallels that are being discovered elsewhere. Frisch suggested that prolonged breast-feeding among inadequately nourished women may lower the fat content of their bodies sufªciently to lengthen the period of postpartum amenorrhea. An average eighteen-month period of postpartum amenorrhea (compared with nine months in a Chilean population) is revealed in records of menstruation collected from a rural population in Camilla district, Bangladesh. The Bangladesh women had average interbirth intervals indicating a level of marital fertility not much higher than among the Chinese Farmers.
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Lee and Wang quote Barclay et al. when they note that "marital fertility as low as that in China would be expected by demographers only in populations in which some combination of contraception and abortion is practiced." They ignore them, however, when they rule out birth control as an explanation and propose instead "prolonged breast-feeding among inadequately nourished women." 32 Lee and Wang's challenge to the received view of China fails for two reasons. The ªrst is the lack of evidence for widespread, de-368 | ARTHUR P. WOLF AND THEO ENGELEN liberate birth control. Marital fertility was lower than in Europe but not as low as Lee and Wang claim. Nor was it low enough to make birth control the only plausible explanation, or even the most likely explanation. The second reason is that contrary to Lee and Wang's central thesis, total fertility was much higher in China than in Europe. Whereas most European fertility rates fell far below the mean for natural-fertility societies, the Chinese rate stood precisely at the mean. Late Imperial China remains more or less where Malthus placed it. It did not enjoy the favorable demographic conditions found in the United States, and it did not have the effective means of fertility control found in Britain. Lee and Wang treat it as a special case, but it was, in fact, representative of the great majority of old states with organic economies. 
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